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Interregional Demand for Workers and the Effects of Labor 
Income Taxation  
Abstract 
 We study the short-run impacts of labor income taxation in an aggregate economy of 𝑁 >2 regions. The distinct regions demand workers. Each region is endowed with one unit of immobile 
capital. The aggregate economy also has one unit of labor that is mobile across the regions. All 
regions produce a final good with identical Cobb-Douglas production functions. The price of 
output is normalized to unity. We perform five tasks. First, we focus on the benchmark case in 
which no region taxes either capital or labor. We find the equilibrium wage, the allocation of 
workers across the regions, and the total income of labor and capital. Second, we study the impact 
of a tax 𝜏 on labor income in region 1 when the other 𝑁 − 1 regions do not tax labor income. We 
ascertain the after-tax return to labor in region 1, the equilibrium wage, and the allocation of labor 
across the regions. Third, we compute the total income of capital and labor and the tax revenue in 
region 1. Fourth, we discuss whether workers in region 1 are better off with a tax on labor income. 
Finally, we comment on the policy implications of our research. 
Keywords: Capital, Labor, Interregional Demand, Labor Income Taxation, Factor Mobility 
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Literature review 
 Regional scientists and urban economists have now modeled and studied a variety of 
interactions between different regions where a region is understood to be a sub-national geographic 
entity. For instance, one group of researchers has analyzed the differences between rural and urban 
regions in the developed world. In this regard, Hall et al. (2006), Yamamoto (2008), and Jordan et 
al. (2014) have concentrated on rural-urban differences in, respectively, health, income, and 
education, in a variety of regions in the developed world. This line of research includes a smaller 
but salient group of studies---see Batabyal and Nijkamp (2014a, 2014b), Batabyal and Beladi 
(2015), and Batabyal (2018)---about lagging and leading regions where rural (urban) regions are 
frequently the lagging (leading) regions.  
A second group of researchers has analyzed the effects of tax competition between different 
regions. In this regard, Bucovetsky (1995) showed that when people are mobile between the 
different regions being studied, tax competition between these regions will give rise to insufficient 
migration. Dembour and Wauthy (2009) concentrate on two contiguous regions and demonstrate 
that in the presence of interregional spillovers, the optimal level of infrastructure in these two 
regions is affected by the intensity of tax competition between them. Wang and Miao (2015) point 
out that tax competition between different provinces in China influences the nature of mergers and 
acquisitions undertaken by firms and also leads to interregional capital flows. Finally, Bai et al. 
(2019) focus on thirty provinces in China and point out that interregional tax competition has a 
negative impact on the local environment and, in addition, it also leads to worsening environmental 
quality in what they call spatially correlated regions.  
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1.2. Our objective 
 Very recently, Batabyal and Nijkamp (2020) have combined aspects of the two literatures 
discussed in the preceding two paragraphs and have analyzed the effects of wage taxation in a 
linear aggregate economy consisting of an urban and an adjacent rural region. They show that 
when these two regions demand workers, inter alia, there are a number of circumstances in which 
the Nash equilibrium wage taxes are, in fact, not taxes but subsidies. A limiting feature of the 
linear model analyzed by these researchers is that it consists of only two contiguous regions. 
Therefore, our principal goal in this paper is to extend the Batabyal and Nijkamp (2020) analysis 
by analyzing a model of labor income taxation in which there are 𝑁 > 2 regions and these 𝑁 
regions are not necessarily contiguous to each other.  
 Before proceeding to the paper itself, we would like to point out that the subject of 
interregional competition resulting in demand for workers and labor income taxation is of interest 
not only from a theoretical but also from a practical standpoint. To see this, the reader should first 
recognize that as noted by Rutkowski (2007), there are many different kinds of labor taxes and 
that labor or personal income taxes are one kind of tax on labor. That said, regions in many 
different countries of the world engage in competition with each other and demand workers and 
therefore the nature and the magnitude of labor income taxes have a clear impact on the ability of 
such regions to compete effectively.4  
 Focusing on Canada, the work of Esteller-More and Sole-Olle (2002) shows that the 
provinces within Canada compete with each other using the personal income tax. However, this 
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In the next paragraph, we discuss tax competition between regions in different nations of the world but this discussion deliberately 
focuses only on labor/personal income taxes. That said, it should be noted that regions in different nations also engage in 
competition using other kinds of taxes such as corporate income and property taxes.  
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competition appears not to be intense, most likely, because of the large size of the individual 
provinces. Blochliger and Pinero-Campos (2011) refer to previous research and point out that 
municipalities within Denmark compete with each other using the personal income tax. In this 
setting, lower tax rates lead to “in-migration” and large municipalities have higher tax rates. 
Moving on to Finland, Kangasharju et al. (2006) note that municipalities in this nation have raised 
the personal income tax over time and that municipalities that have received grants generally tend 
to have higher tax rates. In addition, although demographic factors appear to play no role in the 
determination of the tax rates, the density of the population does matter. Finally, Edmark and 
Agren (2008) examine the competition engaged in by municipalities in Sweden using the personal 
income tax. Their analysis shows that there is spatial correlation in the tax rates among local 
governments and that the underlying competition influences the setting of tax rates.5 
 The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical 
framework of an aggregate economy consisting of 𝑁 > 2 regions that are not necessarily adjoining 
regions. Section 3 focuses on the benchmark case in which no region in the aggregate economy 
taxes either capital or labor. In particular, this section determines the equilibrium wage, the 
allocation of workers across the regions, and the total income received by labor and capital. Section 
4 studies the impact of a tax at rate 𝜏 on labor income in region 1 when the remaining 𝑁 − 1 
regions do not tax labor income. Specifically, this section ascertains the after-tax return to labor 
employed in region 1, the equilibrium wage, and the allocation of labor across the regions in the 
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As noted in the first paragraph of this section, our objective in this paper is not to focus specifically on regions that are contiguous 
to each other. In this respect, our analysis is general and therefore the 𝑁 regions we study may or may not be contiguous to each 
other. That said, we note that in the European Union, for example, there are many examples of border---and hence contiguous---
regions that are linguistically homogeneous but may have different tax systems. Examples include the border regions in Belgium 
and the Netherlands where Dutch/Flemish is spoken, the border regions of south Belgium and France where French is spoken, and 
the border regions of Austria and Germany where the language spoken is German.  
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aggregate economy. Next, this section computes the total income received by labor and capital and 
the tax revenue in region 1 as a function of the number of regions (𝑁) and the tax rate (𝜏). Section 
5 discusses the policy implications of our research. Finally, section 6 concludes and then discusses 
two ways in which the research delineated in this paper might be extended.  
2. The Theoretical Framework 
 Consider an aggregate economy that is made up of 𝑁 > 2 regions. Each of these 𝑁 regions 
is endowed with one unit of capital (𝐾). Capital is immobile across the regions in the model. This 
assumption makes sense only in the short-run and hence the reader should note that the subsequent 
analysis we undertake in this paper is best viewed as a short-run analysis of the impacts of labor 
income taxation in an aggregate economy. The aggregate economy under study also has one unit 
of labor (𝐿). Since the regions in the aggregate economy are demanding workers, we assume that 
the available labor is fully mobile across these regions.  
 Each of the regions in the aggregate economy produces a final good (𝑄) with a constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production function given by6 
    𝑄 = 𝐹(𝐾, 𝐿) = 𝐾ଷ/ସ𝐿ଵ/ସ.      (1) 
The price of the output (𝑄) of this final good is normalized to $1. We now proceed to analyze the 
benchmark case in which no region taxes either capital or labor.  
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If we replace the exponents ¾ and ¼ with arbitrary constants then the subsequent analysis would not change qualitatively. That 
said, the underlying algebra would be more complicated and it would be hard to interpret some of the results in a straightforward 
manner.  
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3. No Taxes on Capital or Labor 
 We begin by ascertaining the equilibrium wage and the allocation of labor across the 
various regions. If none of the regions tax either capital or labor then the initial equilibrium must 
be symmetric. This means that 𝐿 = 1 𝑁⁄  in each region. The wage that we seek is given by 
 
    𝑤 = డி(∙,∙)డ௅ = ଵସ ቀ௄య/ర௅భ/ర௅ ቁ.      (2) 
 
Now, using the result that 𝐿 = 1 𝑁,⁄  we can simplify the right-hand-side (RHS) of equation (2). 
This gives us  
 
    𝑤 = డி(∙,∙)డ௅ = ଵସ ൫𝑁ଷ/ସ൯.      (3) 
 
Using a similar process, the equilibrium interest rate or the return to capital is given by  
 
    𝑟 = డி(∙,∙)డ௄ = ଷସ ቀ௄య/ర௅భ/ర௄ ቁ = ଷସ ൫𝑁ିଵ/ସ൯.    (4) 
 
8 
 
 Having determined the equilibrium wage and the interest rate, it is straightforward to 
compute the total income accruing to labor and to capital. Specifically, using equation (3), the total 
labor income in the aggregate economy is  
 
    𝐼௅ = 𝑤𝐿 = ଵସ ൫𝑁ଷ/ସ൯,       (5) 
 
and, similarly, the total income of capital in our aggregate economy is 
 
    𝐼௄ = 𝑁𝑟𝐾 = ଷସ ൫𝑁ଷ/ସ൯.      (6) 
 
 To study the dependence of the equilibrium wage and the interest rate on the size of the 
aggregate economy or 𝑁, let us compute the actual values of 𝑤 and 𝑟 when there are, respectively,  
[Table 1 about here] 
two regions7 and twenty regions in our aggregate economy. Inspecting Table 1 we see that the 
interest rate falls from 0.63 to 0.35 as the number of regions increases but, in contrast, the wage 
rate rises from 0.42 to 2.36. This happens because the fixed stock of labor in the aggregate economy 
becomes scarcer relative to capital as the number of regions in the model goes up. Having studied 
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Recall that this is the case studied by Batabyal and Nijkamp (2020). 
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this benchmark case, we can now analyze the impact of labor income taxation by region 1 given 
that the remaining 𝑁 − 1 regions do not tax labor income.  
4. Tax on Labor Income 
 Our first task is to ascertain the after-tax wage for labor employed in region 1. To this end, 
let us denote the labor employed in region 1 by 𝐿ଵ. To continue the analysis, we have to make an 
assumption about what the taxing authority in region 1 does with the tax revenue. To this end, to 
keep the analysis straightforward, we suppose that this authority uses the tax revenue to purchase 
the final good produced in this region at price $1.  
 If 𝐿ଵ is the labor employed in region 1 then the labor left over is divided equally among the 
remaining 𝑁 − 1 regions. Denoting the tax rate by 𝜏, the real wage of labor employed in region 1 
is (1 − 𝜏)𝑤ଵ. Now, with the individual regions in the aggregate economy demanding workers, the 
allocation of labor has to be such that the wage across all the regions is equated. This tells us that 𝐿ଵ must satisfy the following relationship 
 
    (1 − 𝜏) ଵସ (𝐿ଵ)ିయర = ଵସ ቀଵି௅భேିଵ ቁିଷ/ସ.      (7) 
 
After several steps of algebra, we can simplify equation (7) further and obtain an explicit 
expression for 𝐿ଵ. That expression is 
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    𝐿ଵ = (ଵିఛ)ర/యேିଵା(ଵିఛ)ర/య.       (8) 
 
Because the remaining labor, i.e., the labor not employed in region 1 is divided equally among the 
remaining 𝑁 − 1 regions, we deduce that  
 
    𝐿௜ = ଵேିଵା(ଵିఛ)ర/య      (9) 
 
for 𝑖 = 2,3, … , 𝑁. Inspecting equations (8) and (9), we see that the labor employed in both the 
taxing region 1 and in all the other regions decreases as the number of regions (𝑁) comprising the 
aggregate economy increases.  
 Let us now compute the equilibrium wage in region 1. From the left-hand-side (LHS) of 
equation (7), we deduce that the wage we seek is given by  
 
    𝑤ଵ = ଵସ (𝐿ଵ)ିଷ/ସ = ଵସ ቂ{ேିଵା(ଵିఛ)ర/య}య/రଵିఛ ቃ.    (10) 
 
Using a similar line of reasoning, the wage in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region, 𝑖 = 2,3, … , 𝑁, is  
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    𝑤௜ = ଵସ (𝐿௜)ିଷ/ସ = ଵସ ൛𝑁 − 1 + (1 − 𝜏)ସ/ଷൟଷ/ସ.   (11) 
 
Inspecting equations (10) and (11), it is easy to confirm that an increase in the size of the aggregate 
economy or (𝑁) increases the equilibrium wage not only in the taxing region 1 but also in all the 
other regions comprising the aggregate economy. This happens because the total amount of capital 
in the aggregate economy increases by one unit every time a new region is added but the total 
amount of labor is unaffected.  
 What are the rewards to the two factors capital (𝐾) and labor (𝐿) in region 1 before the 
imposition of the tax on labor income? This question can be answered by using equations (7) and 
(4). Specifically, the before-tax labor income in region 1 is given by 
 
    𝑤ଵ𝐿ଵ = ଵସ (𝐿ଵ)ିଷ/ସ𝐿ଵ = ଵସ ቂ (ଵିఛ)భ/య{ேିଵା(ଵିఛ)ర/య}భ/రቃ.   (12) 
 
Using a similar line of reasoning, capital income in region 1 is  
 
    𝑟ଵ𝐾ଵ = ଷସ (𝐿ଵ)ଵ/ସ = ଷସ ቂ (ଵିఛ)భ/య{ேିଵା(ଵିఛ)ర/య}భ/రቃ.    (13) 
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 Let us denote the revenue from the imposition of the tax (𝜏) on labor income in region 1 
by (𝑅ଵ). Simple algebra shows that this revenue is given by  
 
    𝑅ଵ = 𝜏𝑤ଵ𝐿ଵ = ଵସ ቂ ఛ(ଵିఛ)భ/య{ேିଵା(ଵିఛ)ర/య}భ/రቃ.     (14) 
 
Using equation (14), we can state two results. To see the first, let us differentiate the RHS of 
equation (14) with respect to 𝑁. Doing this, we see that for a given tax rate, the revenue from this 
tax is decreasing in the size of the aggregate economy. This result arises because as the size of the 
aggregate economy becomes larger, the tax base becomes smaller.8 
 Second, for every integer value of 𝑁, there exists a maximum level of tax revenue for 𝜏 ∈[0, 1]. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Specifically, the top solid curve shows how tax revenue  
[Figure 1 about here] 
changes as the tax rate is gradually increased for a small (𝑁 = 2) aggregate economy. The middle 
dashed curve and the bottom dotted curve depict the same information when the aggregate 
economy is of intermediate size (𝑁 = 5) and when it is large (𝑁 = 10).  
 Finally, how does the tax on labor income in region 1 affect the welfare of workers as 
measured by the wage in this region? To answer this question, let us fix the tax rate at 𝜏 = 0.20 
and consider two cases. In the first case, the aggregate economy is small in the sense that it is made 
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Recall that the amount of labor in our aggregate economy is fixed at one unit.  
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up of only two regions and hence 𝑁 = 2. In the second case, the aggregate economy is ten times 
larger and therefore 𝑁 = 20 now. Using equation (10), Table 2 gives us the answer. We see that  
[Table 2 about here] 
in both small and large aggregate economies, the tax increases the equilibrium wage and therefore 
makes workers in region 1 better off. Similar computations (not shown) demonstrate that the wage 
in the remaining 𝑁 − 1 regions, after the imposition of the tax in region 1, declines irrespective of 
the size of the aggregate economy. We now discuss the policy repercussions that arise from the 
research we have undertaken in this paper.  
5. Policy Implications 
 Inspecting equations (8) and (9), it is easy to confirm that the amount of labor in any one 
of the regions in our model is a declining function of the number of regions (𝑁) in the aggregate 
economy. In addition because the total amount of labor in the aggregate economy is fixed at one 
unit, the larger the number of regions, the more dispersed is this labor as long as the individual 
regions are homogeneous. The preceding point also means that this dispersed labor will earn, in 
general, the same real wage in every region.  
 Next, let us understand what happens to the welfare of workers in both the taxing region 1 
and in the remaining (𝑁 − 1) non-taxing regions. As far as the amount of labor is concerned, we 
want to compare the pre-tax amount with the post-tax amount. Without any tax on labor income 
imposed by region 1, the amount of labor in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region is 𝐿௜ = 1 𝑁.⁄  With the region 1 tax in 
place, the amount of labor in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region is given by equation (9). Comparing the 𝐿௜ = 1/𝑁 
expression with the RHS of equation (9), it is clear that the amount of labor in the 𝑖𝑡ℎ region with 
the tax is higher than the amount of labor without the tax. So, from a purely amount or quantity 
14 
 
standpoint, as expected, the region 1 labor income tax drives some labor out of region 1 and into 
the remaining (𝑁 − 1) non-taxing regions. That said, the analysis of Table 2 in the last paragraph 
of the previous section tells us that from a wage standpoint, the employed workers in region 1 (all 
other regions) benefit (lose) from the labor income tax because their post-tax wages are higher 
(lower) than the pre-tax wage.  
 The key message to take away from this discussion is fourfold. First, in region 1, after the 
imposition of the labor income tax, the amount of workers employed in this region is smaller but 
these employed workers are paid a higher wage. Put differently, the labor income tax in region 1 
works somewhat like a minimum wage program. This means that relative to the no minimum wage 
(no labor income tax) equilibrium, the equilibrium with the minimum wage (labor income tax) 
results in a higher wage but for a smaller pool of employed workers. Second, the story is different 
for the remaining (𝑁 − 1) non-taxing regions. After the imposition of the labor income tax in 
region 1, these regions collectively benefit from a larger amount of employed labor but this 
employed labor receives a lower wage. Third, in terms of the “price effect,” region 1 gains (higher 
wage) and the remaining (𝑁 − 1) regions lose (lower wage). In terms of the “quantity effect,” 
region 1 loses (smaller pool of labor) and the remaining (𝑁 − 1) regions benefits (larger pool of 
labor). Finally, since the price and the quantity effects in region 1 and in the remaining non-taxing 
regions work in opposite directions, it is unlikely that all the regions in our aggregate economy 
lose with the region 1 labor income tax but, theoretically speaking, this possibility cannot be ruled 
out with probability one.9 This completes our discussion of interregional demand for workers and 
the effects of labor income taxation.  
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6. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we studied the short-run impacts of labor income taxation in an aggregate 
economy of 𝑁 > 2 regions where the individual regions demanded workers. Each region was 
endowed with one unit of capital and capital was immobile. The aggregate economy also had one 
unit of labor that was fully mobile across the regions. All regions produced a final good with 
identical Cobb-Douglas production functions. The price of output was normalized to unity. In this 
setting, we completed five tasks. First, we focused on the benchmark case in which no region taxed 
either capital or labor. We determined the equilibrium wage, the allocation of workers across the 
regions, and the total income received by labor and capital. Second, we examined the impact of a 
tax at rate 𝜏 on labor income in region 1 when the remaining 𝑁 − 1 regions did not tax labor 
income. We ascertained the after-tax return to labor employed in region 1, the equilibrium wage, 
and the allocation of labor across the regions. Third, we calculated the total income received by 
labor and capital and the tax revenue in region 1. Fourth, we discussed whether workers in region 
1 were better off with a tax on labor income in the region in which they were employed. Finally, 
we commented on the policy implications of our research.  
 The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of different directions. Here are two 
suggestions for extending the research described here. First, it would be useful to analyze the tax 
policy of a region and the allocation of workers to the different regions when these decisions are 
made over time and not at a point in time. Second, it would be helpful to expand the policy 
instruments that regional governments are able to use to attract workers to their regions.10 Studies 
                                                          
Our commentary on the impact of the region 1 labor income tax on the wage in region 1 and in the remaining (𝑁 − 1) regions is 
based on the Table 2 analysis where 𝜏 = 0.2, 𝑁 = 2, and 𝑁 = 20. We have worked with many other combinations of numerical 
values for 𝜏 and 𝑁 and hence we believe that our reported results are robust. That said, comparing equations (3) and (10) should 
convince the reader that it is not possible to make a general statement about what happens to the wage with the labor income tax 
without imposing a lot more structure on the problem that we are studying here.  
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that analyze these aspects of the underlying problem will increase our understanding of the nexuses 
between tax policies on the one hand and the workplace choices of individuals on the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Suppose that the revenue from labor income taxation in region 1 is used in a way that either enhances the productivity of the capital 
in this region or provides outstanding educational facilities that workers care about. Then we could think of the analysis conducted 
in this paper not only in terms of the interregional demand for workers but also in terms of the interregional competition between 
regions for workers.  
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Factor Return 𝑁 = 2 𝑁 = 20 𝑤 ൬14൰ 2ଷ/ସ = 0.42 ൬14൰ 20ଷ/ସ = 2.36 𝑟 ൬34൰ 2ିଵ/ସ = 0.63 ൬34൰ 20ିଵ/ସ = 0.35 
 
Table 1: Dependence of factor rewards on the number of regions 
 
Tax Rate 𝜏 = 0.20 𝑁 = 2 𝑁 = 20 
Before Tax 𝑤ଵ = ൬14൰ 2ଷ/ସ = 0.42 𝑤ଵ = ൬14൰ 20ଷ/ସ = 2.36 
After Tax 𝑤ଵ = ൬ 516൰ 1.74ଷ/ସ = 0.47 𝑤ଵ = ൬ 516൰ 19.74ଷ/ସ = 2.92 
 
Table 2: Welfare of workers in region 1 before and after the imposition of the tax 
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Figure 1: Dependence of tax revenue on the tax rate 𝜏 and the number of regions 𝑁; top solid curve 
shows revenue changes as 𝜏 is increased for a small (𝑁 = 2) aggregate economy. The middle 
dashed and the bottom dotted curves depict the same information for intermediate (𝑁 = 5) and 
large (𝑁 = 10) aggregate economies.  
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